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THE POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION IN PUNJAB:  




Disastrous though its consequences may have been in recent years, religious and ethnic 
polarization is clearly in no sense unique to the Punjab. Similar processes of division and 
confrontation are an only too manifest in many other parts of the sub-continent, just as they 
are in almost every corner of the globe   North and South, East and West, Capitalist and 
"Socialist", developed and under-dev loped. Wherever one chooses to look, religious and 
ethnic polarization is one of the most salient   and perhaps simply the most salient   sources of 
social and political instability in the contemporary world. 
 One such processes of polarization are in full flow, they invariably lead   as is manifestly the 
case in contemporary Punjab   to the articulation of ever more extreme charges and counter-
charges. Thus while minority groups begin make ever more serious charges of malfeasance 
against the locally-dominant majority, with the result that greater social and political 
autonomy, or better still complete Independence, soon come to be perceived as the only viable 
remedy for their grievances, majorities tend to become equally vigorously committed to the 
opposite position: that not only are minority grievances wholly without foundation, but their 
very articulation amounts to a traitorous assault on national unity. As polarization develops, 
every move by either side to protect or advance its interests is therefore perceived as deeply 
threatening by the othr. Thus both invariably find ample scope to develop arguments to the 
effect that righteousness lies wholly on their side, and that the others therefore deserve 
everything thrown at them.  
 Partition   pulling the two sides apart, and erecting a clear barrier between the contending 
parties   often appears to be the only viable solution to such conflicts. Yet far from resolving 
the problem of polarisation, such a solution often does little more than redouble its intensity   
albeit on a slightly different plae. Formal social and geographical partition may be used to 
resolve one set of contradictions, but rarely, if ever, does it bring the process of ethnic division 
and polarization to a halt. Like a decapitated hydra,  further   and often yet fiercer   process s
of polarization only too often spring up within each of the resultant sub-divisions. And so the 
process continues. 
 
Polarization and Partition in Punjab 
 
Thus despite having gone through its own traumatic process of Partition in 1947, which pitted 
the Muslims on the one hand against the Hindus and Sikhs on the other, and which led to a 
bloody civil war during the course of which several hundred thousand people lost their lives, 
while as many as ten million more were forced to abandon their ancestral homes, Punjab's 
troubles didn't stop there. While Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs had indeed been close allies in 
opposition to the Muslims in 1947, tensions between them swiftly mounted during the post-
partition period, and have continued to escalate ever since.  
 So it was that despite a further administrative partition in 1966, which separated off the 
nominally Hindi-speaking (but clearly Hindu-dominated) State of Haryana to the south and 
east, from a now heavily truncated (but Sikh-major ty) remnant hard up against the Pakistani 
border to the north and west, and despite the new Punjab's growing wealth   for it was, and is, 
one of the success stories of the Green Revolution, such that it's population has a markedly 
higher living standard than that found anywhere else in India   the Punjabi social order is still 
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rent with tension, and no less so between sections of its own population than between Punjabis 
as a whole and the central administration in Delhi. 
 
Centre/Periphery Tensions in the Indian Union 
 
At the all-India level, the Punjabis are not alone in feeling irked by the severity of the 
administrative, financial and political constrictions which centralised rule from Delhi imposes 
upon them. Although nominally a union or federation which devolves considerable power on 
regional state governments, both Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel   the very architects of India's 
post-Independence administrative structures   made sure that decisive power was ultimately 
concentrated in the central government in Delhi. They felt that this was the only way in which 
the stability of a country so massively diverse as India could be achieved.  
 With hindsight, it is now clear that the policy of centralisation which Nehru and Patel 
pursued with such vigour (though it must also be noted that it was one to which their British 
had been equally vigorously committed) has had exactly the opposite effect from that 
intended, and nowhere more so than in terms of its impact on those regions which are 
peripheral to India's Hindi-speaking   and politically dominant   heartland. 
 So it was that ever since 1947 Punjabis have   in common with members of many other 
groups right round the non-Hindi-speaking periphery   chafed against the lack of regional 
autonomy allowed them by India's highly centralised admini trative system. As they see it (and 
there is considerable justice in their arguments) central government policies have always 
heavily favoured the central Hindi-speaking areas, with the result that the more peripheral 
areas   from Kashmir to Tamilnad, a d from Assam to Kerala   have been set systematically at 
a disadvantage. 
 Many of those arguments have centred around issues of language and religion, for since 
1947 the authorities in Delhi have very overtly sought to give a privileged status both to the 
Hindi language, and more recently to their version of Hinduism as well, to the growing alarm 
of Punjabi-speaking Sikhs. But in addition to these essentially cultural matters, Punjabis in 
general and Sikhs in particular have also long also long felt that their materi l interests have 
been equally seriously overlooked. Their complaints include the diminishing rate of 
recruitment of Punjabis into the central services, and most particularly the Army; the failure to 
establish any large-scale state-financed industrial and infrastructural projects within Punjab; 
low procurement prices for wheat and rice, especially in contrast to steady inflation in the 
price of essential agricultural inputs such as diesel and fertiliser; inequities in inter-state 
irrigation water distribution policies; and finally lack of progress on a whole series of border 
disputes with Punjab's neighbour Haryana, and not least with respect to their shared 
administrative capital, Chandigarh. 
 All these complaints had some substance, and had some response come from the other side   
and in an Indian context that means the central government   all were eminently negotiable. 
But that was not to be: Punjabi grievances have, for the most part, simply been left to fester. 
That was bad enough. However all these contradictions have been hugely exacerbated by the 
rise of, and even more so because of the overwhelmingly disastrous character of the 
circumstances of the fall of, a charismatic Sikh preacher named Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. 
Besides opening up a whole series of internal contradictions within the Punjabi social order, 
his death and its consequences have sewn these together with a further series of contradictions 
between Punjab and Delhi   and beyond that between an emergent Punjabi nationalism the 
powerfully chauvinistic currents of Hindu nationalism was has also proved immensely popular 
right across the Hindi-speaking heartland of central north India. Every development in this 
process seems to have led on to ever more disastrous consequences.  
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The Rise and Fall of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale 
 
As Mark Tully in particular has shown, Bhindranwale's rise from obscurity was greatly 
facilitated by Indira Gandhi herself, as well as by Gyani Zail Singh, the Sikh politician   and 
former Chief Minister of the Punjab   who was by then serving as President of India. Their 
motivations were clear enough. Mrs. Gandhi was playing her usual game of making friends 
with all her enemies' enemies, and thus reinforcing her ability to keep potentially errant state 
governments very firmly in check; meanwhile Zail Singh, though isolated from office in the 
Punjab as a result of his occupancy of the Presidential Palace in New Delhi, was equally 
determined to keep a finger in the pie, not least in order to cause as much embarr s ent as 
possible to his own long-standing rivals amongst Punjab's established political leadership. So 
although their motivations may have differed somewhat, both seem to have concluded that 
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was their man.  
 Although he was clearly blessed with a great deal of personal charisma, Jarnail Singh   the 
fifth son in a family of Jat Sikh small peasant farmers from the village of Bhindran, which lies 
?? miles south east of Amritsar   was but one Sikh revivalist preacher amongst many, although 
perhaps of slightly greater eminence than many thanks to his succession to the leadership of 
the Damdama Taksal (a shrine-cum-seminary) at the relatively early age of ?? in 197?. The 
core theme of Bhindranwale's teaching was hardly exceptional, involving, as it did, a 
thoroughgoing insistence that Sikhs must return to the behavioral rules of the khalsa, as laid 
down by Guru Gobind Singh in 1699 if they wished to avoid the ever-present danger of sliding 
back into Hinduism once again   a position which he shared with many other preachers of Sikh 
revivalism.  
 Yet in doing so, Bhindranwale was no urban sophisticate. Explicitly rural in both his 
behaviour and diction, his arguments also very directly represented the sensitivities and the 
interests of Punjab's smaller peasant farmers, and most especially so in the context of the 
benefits   and pains   of the success of the green revolution. As result Jarnail Singh was 
vigorously critical of Punjab's established political elite, whom he accused of selfishly 
overlooking the interests of small but good-hearte  an honest peasants in the more remote 
rural areas. While this charge certainly had some substance   especially in the light of the 
unequal social and economic impact of the Green Revolution   what really gave his criticisms 
force was Bhindranwale's insistence that the elite (most of whose members were Sikh, though 
not all were Jats) were morally corrupt, so much so that they had sold out to the faithless and 
money-grubbing Brahmins of Delhi.  
 In facilitating the rise of Bhindranwale   whom they presumably saw as little more than a 
populist rabble rouser with a capacity to embarrass an elite group which they too, though for 
different reasons, wanted to put on the spot   both Indira Gandhi and Zail Sing clearly made a 
grave mistake, above all because they grossly underestimated the potential popular appeal of 
Jarnail Singh's anti-Hindu, anti-Brahmin, anti-shopkeeper, and anti-Hindu-chauvinist rhetoric 
to large sections of Sikh society.  
 But despite Bhindranwale's undoubted popularity, it should never be forgotten that neither 
he, nor even more so his followers were in any way reluctant to reinforce their demands for 
the construction of a new moral order down the barrels of their guns. On the ideological front
they justified the use of force on the grounds that Guru Gobind Singh had taught that Sikhs 
should act as sant sipahi, as saint-soldiers prepared to take vigorous action   which could be 
military if necessary   in support of righteousness. Mea while at a more practical level they 
were able to carry their weapons with great confidence, secure in the knowledge that the 
police would be restrained   as a result of instructions issued by the President of India himself   
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from taking action against them. A reign of terror was soon unleashed, which the regular 
administrative agencies of the government of Punjab   from the police onwards   were 
powerless to contain.  
 Once securely holed up within the sacred precincts of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, 
Bhindranwale began to organise what amounted to an alternative system of justice of his own. 
Villagers could petition him freely, and offenders were summoned   on pain of death   to 
answer for their misdeeds. Bhindranwale's judgements were instant, and summary; and while 
the outcome often did, when things went well, represent popular moral assumptions, there was 
also endless scope to justify all manner of mayhem   including the assassination of the second 
in command of the Punjab Police on the steps of the Golden T mple itself   on the grounds 
that it must necessarily have represented the just will of the new saviour of Sikhism. 
 Embarrassing the Punjab Government was, of course, the original object of the exercise, 
but by early 1984 it was obvious that Frankenstei  was out of control, and that the monster 
whose emergence Indira Gandhi and Gyani Zail Singh had so blithely facilitated would have to 
be brought back under control. At long last the Government of India steeled itself to act: but 
so bungled were its efforts that it precipitated a dramatic worsening of the situation, and 
powerfully reinforced the incipient tensions between the Sikhs on the one hand and the Hindus 
on the other.  
 
Operation Bluestar and its Consequences 
 
Clearly envisaging the prospects of a physical challenge to their position from the central 
government, by the summer of 1984 Bhindranwale and his men had begun to concentrate 
themselves in fortified positions in and around the Akal Takht, the second most sacred Sikh 
shrine after the Har Mandir Sahib itself, and both of which are contained within the Golden 
Temple complex in Amritsar. At this point it is also worth noting that in the period 
immediately before the Indian Army began to take action against him, Bhindranwale's 
occupation of the shrine, together with his adamant refusal to countenance any kind of 
argument with or opposition to his perspective   usually on the grounds that anyone who 
disagreed with his position was ipso facto a sellout to the other side   most certainly did not 
find favour with all Sikhs. Quite the contrary: very many, and especially those with a strong 
commitment to the more spiritual dimensions of the Gurus' teachings, regarded these 
developments with horror. However the bungling ineptitude with which the Indian Army 
carried out Operation Bluestar   their codename for the assault on the Temple to take out 
Bhindranwale   changed all that.  
 Bhindranwale's men had been guided in their fortification of the Temple complex by Major-
General (retired) Shubeg Singh, an expert in guerilla warfare, and as a result they were able to 
put up a far stiffer resistance than had been expected. Within minutes of the opening assault, 
perhaps as many as a hundred soldiers had lost their lives in a murderously constructed killing 
field just inside the entrance to the parikrama; command and control collapsed, and the usually 
well disciplined Indian army simply ran amok. Their first step was to dispose of a 
comparatively easy target   the hundreds, perhaps thousands of pilgrims whose only offense 
was to have been trapped inside the temple complex when the Bluestar curfew was imposed, 
and who had taken shelter in the Dharamshalas at the far end of the compound from the Akal 
Takht. An unknown number died. Only then did they seriously attend to eliminating 
Bhindranwale and his two hundred or so armed followers. It was over 48 hours before they 
were all dead, and before then a number of light tanks had been driven onto the sacred 
parikrama, from where they shelled the Akal Takht itself, virtually demolishing it. 
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 No-one can doubt the need to have brought Bhindranwale's activities to an end, but what 
can most certainly be questioned is the manner in which it was done: so, for example, while a 
straightforward siege would have lasted much longer, there would at least have been a good 
chance that Bhindranwale's surrender could have been secured without causing serious 
damage to the sacred structure of the temple itself. Many Sikhs would have been relieved at 
such an outcome. Bluestar had the very opposite effect, however. So extensive was the 
damage that all Sikhs were both horrified and outraged by what they inevitably viewed as an 
act of sacrilege, while Bhindranwale   now safely dead   was instantly transformed into a 
shaheed, a martyr who could, by definition, do no wrong.  
 In the immediate aftermath of Bluestar there was at least a chance that the Sikh's deeply 
hurt feelings might have been assuaged if the authorities in Delhi had at least recognised that 
Sikh feelings were hurt, and if some attempt had at least been made to apologise for the 
Army's disastrous tactics, and even more so their loss of command and control, during the 
course of Operation Bluestar. However the Government of India chose, instead, to pursue the 
very opposite course. Largely in response to Hindu chauvinist pressures emanating from the 
so-called "cow belt"   India's Hindi-speaking heartland to the east and south of Delhi   every 
possible effort was made to rubbish the Sikhs' concerns. So it was that Sant Jarnail Singh 
Bhindranwale, the Sikhs' latest shaheed, was regularly described as a Pakistani agent who had 
been hell-bent on destroying the unity of India by force, while scurrilous stories about his 
personal life, and which suggested amongst other things that he and his follow rs were drug 
addicts and sexual perverts, were much peddled in the media.  
 Few Sikhs were greatly surprised, therefore, when two of Indira Gandhi's Sikh bodyguards 
chose to take revenge by turning their guns on their mistress less than six months la er.  
 But worse was, of course, to follow. In what was clearly a well-co-ordinated pogrom 
organised by local Congress Party bigwigs, squads of Hindu goondas were trucked into 
Delhi's relatively prosperous Sikh settlements, and encouraged to do their worst; and for forty-
eight hours the police stood by   doubtless following official orders   and did nothing.  
 As chaos reigned, most members of Delhi's Sikh population   which is several hundred 
thousand strong   took ignominious shelter in the houses of their Hindu neighbours. Much 
property was looted as they did so, but they did at least escape with their lives, for in total 
some two thousand Sikhs   most of whom, ironically enough, were not Punjabis at all, but 
members of the relatively impoverished Sindhi Sikh community   were slaughtered by the mob. 
Worse still the Government took no action to investigate just who was responsible for 
organising the pogrom, or to bring any charges whatsoever against any of those who had 
committed such blatant acts of murder, looting and arson on the streets of the Capital itself. 
But if the mob was allowed to escape scott free, it is only too clear that the authorities' 
inaction very accurately reflected the weight of public opinion. Throughout northern India the 
great majority of Hindus of all kinds and classes simply took it for granted that the Sikhs 
needed to be "taught a lesson"; and that if they had failed to take it aboard, the same 
punishment would have to be meted out all over again.
 While she was alive, Indira Gandhi had often sought to take advantage of popular currents 
of chauvinistic Hindu nationalism. After her death those small currents swiftly became a 
torrent. A huge wave of chauvinism which blamed the sub-Continent's non-Hindu population   
Moslem no less than Sikh   for all of India's many ills swept across the land. This led, amongst 
other things, to the re- lection of a Congress Government with an unprecedented majority 
under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi's son, Rajiv. 
 But whatever the circumstances of his victory, in its immediate aftermath Rajiv behaved in 
a far more magnanimous way than his mother would ever have dared to: thus one of his first 
acts as Prime Minister was to visit Amritsar, where he at least made partial amends for the 
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sacrilegious atrocities of Bluestar. Even more impressively, Rajiv moved swiftly to strike a 
deal with Sant Harcharan Singh Langowal which, by giving Chandigarh wholly to Punjab and 
by re-opening the issue of irrigation water distribution, as well as by promising the restoratio  
of due legal processes with respect both to the treatment of Sikh "mutineers" in the Army and 
to the victims of the Delhi riots, and finally with a promise a full-scale independent inquiry into 
the causes of those riots, went a very long way towards ssuaging Sikh demands. 
 
The Rise of the Impossiblists 
 
But there were saboteurs about. Although Langowal had a long track-record of supporting 
calls for greater autonomy both for the Sikhs and for the Punjab, with the result that he was 
much respected as a politico/religious leader, he had always been a vigorous opponent of 
Bhindranwale's militant chauvinism. So it was that although all the indications were that the 
great majority of Sikhs were relieved and pleased at the concessions that Langowal had 
extracted from Rajiv in their accord, within days of signing it Langowal was himself 
assassinated as a sell-out. Bhindranwale's impossibilist followers were showing their hand once 
again.  
 In gaining a perspective on the real extent of Sikh support for extremist p sitions   such as 
the establishment of a wholly independent Khalistan, the assassination of Sant Harcharan 
Singh Langowal, let alone for the multitude of even bloodier atrocities that have taken place in 
the years that followed   always was, and almost certainly still is, restricted to a minority 
hardliners. Had the authorities in Delhi been prepared to make good their promises to 
Langowal, let alone the deals they subsequently seemed to be about to strike with a whole 
secession of democratically elected, but inevitably increasingly assertive, representatives of 
Sikh interests, the extremists would soon have had the ground cut right away from beneath 
their feet. But unfortunately the authorities did the very opposite, and have found, one excuse 
after another to renenge on their agreements. Predictably enough, the consequences have been 
quite disastrous. To the Sikhs, such behaviour simply provided further confirmation of their 
growing paranoia about the mindless hostility of the central government in Delhi   and by
extension of Hindus in general   towards them; meanwhile every broken promise increased the 
scale of the concessions required to tempt them into entering the next round of negotiations. 
But from the Hindu point of view the Sikhs' apparent "intransigence", together with the ever 
larger concessions to their interests that they inevitably demanded, increased the prospect that 
the Hindus in their turn also reject all such deals, most usually on the grounds that the 
concessions made in the previous round were   whether renenged upon or not   were already 
far too large. Since Hindu/Sikh polarisation was given an additional vicious twist at almost 
every stage in this process, so sectarian divisions have grown steadily wider and deeper right 
across northern India.  
 In Punjab itself the security situation has deteriorated most alarmingly: in an ever-
increasing spiral of violence, the death toll   arising either from "terrorist" assaults, or from 
"police encounters" of one kind or another   has now risen beyond 3,000 a year. The broad 
pattern of this deterioration is easy enough to identify. Having pulled the plug on processes of 
democratic representation in Punjab, the authorities have also pushed normal administrative 
and judicial procedures into abeyance as they have sought to suppress terrorism by force.  
 But in doing so they have lost out on all fronts: violence continues unabated, while the 
Government has contrived to lose all semblance of credibility, most especially in the 
countryside. It is here that most "terrorists" have their base, and here, too, that the Police and 
the Army have sought to use every available means, foul no less than fair, to track them down. 
Villagers therefore find themselves in a most unenviable position. In an ideal world they would 
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much prefer to avoid harassment by Goondas(bandits) altogether, if faced with the stark 
choice between submitting to the demands of Police G ondas or to those made by their own 
local Goondas, most villagers would much prefer to do a deal with the latter. Local lads can at 
least be regarded as "our boys"; and if the worst comes to the worst, their deaths can be 
legitimated by identifying them as martyrs for the sacred cause of local autonomy   Khalistan.  
 But if the Punjabi countryside has consequently become a hotbed of "Sikh militancy" from 
which the Hindu population   most of whom made their living as shopkeepers   has largely fled 
in fear, Punjab's towns, which in any case have always been dominated by Hindu merchants, 
have increasingly looked like Hindu islands set in a Sikh sea. Not that population transfer 
offers any kind of solution. For Sikh peasants, the villages remain as dangerous as ever; and 
although the towns may well be a great deal safer than the villages, as far as Punjabi Hindus 
are concerned they are very far from secure. As hit and run attacks   directed at least as much 
at persons as at property   grow ever more frequent, Punjabi Hindus are becoming ever more 
vocal in their demands for more and better protection, or in other words f r ever more 
vigorous police and para-military intervention to contain Sikh "terrorism". And to the extent 
that the authorities respond to their pleas for the application of yet more violence   as needs 
they must, given the immense weight of popular political pressure to "save Hinduism" 
emanating from the Hindi-speaking areas further down the Gangetic plains   the ever-
deteriorating process of religious and ethnic polarisation between Punjabi Sikhs on the one 
hand, and Punjabi Hindus on the other is given yet another vicious twist.  
 
The Wider Context: the Roots and Logic of Differentiation 
 
Nor is any resolution of these problems anywhere in sight. Both sides have now grown so 
mistrustful of the other that there is now no obvious in which the contradictions between them 
can be bridged, at least in the short term. So rather than dwelling on the intractability of 
current problems, my aim here is to stand back a little from the immediate issues, in order to 
ask some more searching questions about the nature and dynamics of processes of religious 
and ethnic polarization, and also to place current developments in a wider historical and 
analytical context.  
 As was noted at the outset, traumatic forms of religious and ethnic polarization are in no 
way unique to he Punjab: on the contrary it is becoming increasingly clear that virtually all the 
most explosive social and political contradictions in the contemporary world rest on precisely 
parallel sets of contradictions. Hence it follows that any conclusions which we might reach 
about the dynamics of polarisation in Punjab may well prove illuminating in a wide variety of 
other contexts; and by the same token lessons learned elsewhere are likely to equally useful 
with respect to the Punjab. 
 How, then, are we to understand the roots, and the dynamics, of current contradictions?  
 One view   much canvassed by those who are actively involved in such processes of 
polarisation   is that all this is an inevitable consequence of innate and immutable differences 
between the two sides. Sikhs and Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs, Buddhists and Tamils and so on 
and so forth differ so comprehensively   so the protagonists argue   that they are like oil and 
water. They cannot and will not mix. Hence, they insist, the only permanent way in which 
ethnic tensions can be resolved is through a wholesale separation of the two parties, where 
each gains control of its own self-gov rning territory, which encloses, in turn, a religiously and 
ethnically homogeneous   and therefore presumably harmonious   population. Yet however 
reasonable such a proposition may seem to its protagonists, it is not hard to see why attempts 
to implement such a solution so often achieves nothing of the sort.  
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Non-homogeneity and the Dialectics of Polarisation 
 
In the first place it is worth remembering that non-homogeneity is far from unusual. On the 
contrary, human  society is irredeemably plural, with the result that with the possible exception 
of the very smallest of islands, all population aggregates contain a great deal of social, cultural, 
linguistic and religious variation. But contrary to the assumptions of naive nationalists, such 
disjunctions are rarely congruent with one other, nor do they have clearly marked boundaries 
in spatial terms. Instead they invariably overlap, and it is precisely their social, economic and 
geographical inter-p netration of these diversities which causes so much difficulty once ethnic 
polarization begins. Once again, it is easy to see why. 
 To be in a minority is always a risky business: one's own interests are in constant danger of 
being overlooked, not least because the priorities of the wider social order within which one is 
encapsulated, as well as the values in terms of which it is structured will almost certainly have 
been constructed in such a way as to reflect the assumptions   and thus to advance the interests   
of the dominant majority, whoever they happen to be. When communities subsist in isolation, 
such disjunctions are, however, of relatively little account; but the more they ar  drawn into 
each others' orbits, the more they compete with one another, and the more, above all, that 
interests begin to be expressed and negotiated in collective terms within these much wider 
arenas, the more concerned smaller socio-cultural groups will tend to grow about the 
potentially hegemonic impact of majority priorities on both their material interests and their 
distinctive religious and cultural values. And the more threatening such hegemony becomes, 
the more likely it is that minorities will begin to regard ethnic organisation as their most urgent 
priority: in these circumstances more and more of everyone's efforts are likely to be directed 
towards establishing a more secure and autonomous social, political and cultural arena   and in 
the extreme case, into towards the creation of an independent, territorially  delimited state   
within which they could expect to express their own genius much more freely in their own 
terms. 
 To some observers   and especially to those who have not themselves suffered from the 
tribulations of exclusionism   the enthusiastic single-mindedn ss with which members of many 
minority groups press forward such demands often seems as parochial as it is paranoid. But 
those who make such judgements   whether they do so from a liberal or from a Marxist 
perspective   would do well to remember that minority fears about suffocating impact of 
majority hegemony may in fact be well grounded, and most especially so when those whom 
they confront have themselves been infected by th virus of nationalism.  
 The utilisation of religious and cultural symbols as a means of reinforcing social and 
political solidarity is, of course, by no means restricted to minority groups. On the contrary 
large and dominant groups have exploited the mobilising potentialities of ethnicity just 
vigorously, and just as frequently as anyone else: nationalism is no more than ethnicity dressed 
up in more ideologically respectable clothes. Thus despite having the advantages of the weight 
of numbers very firmly on their side, majority groups have proved no less prone to attacks of 
paranoid anxiety about the security and autonomy of their cultural traditions than have 
beleaguered minorities. So it is that apparently secure majority groups in all parts of the world 
have regularly identified their own local minorities   be they Jews, Gypsies, Basques, "coloured 
immigrants", Muslims, Sikhs or "untouchables" and many others   as an enemy within whose 
very presence threatens (or so it is alleged) the homogeneity and integrity of the established 
social and cultural order.  
 Thus the circle is complete. Once majorities begin to identify their own ways not just as a 
mark of normality, but as the nec ssary grounding for all legitimate activities, and in all 
probability as the very essence of civilisation itself, local minorities will by definition feel 
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increasingly exposed. More likely than not they will find themselves under ever more intense 
pressure to convert, to assimilate, and more generally to adopt a policy of cultural submission   
with no guarantee, in view of their heritage, that they will even meet full social acceptance 
having done so; yet if they fail to conform they may well be told to get lost, and to get the hell 
out of it. But if majorities regularly overlook the extent to which their demands conform to the 
rules of Catch 22, the minorities are only too well aware of it. Nor is that all. While exposure 
to such hypocrisy  powerfully reinforces minority fears about the intransigent character of 
majority hegemony, any attempt which they make to complain about being so treated, or to 
resist the hegemony to which they are subjected, is just as inevitably perceived   from a 
majority perspective   as yet further evidence of the minorities' fickleness, deviousness, 
disloyalty and ingratitude, and hence as justification for the application of yet more hegemonic 
pressure.  
 The dialectics are clear enough: in circumstances such as these both sides will set about 
building ever more elaborate boundaries around itself the better to contain the perceived threat 
emanating from the other; and they will do so in such a way that their rivals' every move will 
appear to justify a yet more fevered bout of boundary construction on their own part. Few 
would disagree that mutual exclusionism of this kind is the principal driving force behind all 
contemporary processes of ethnic polarisation.  
 
Partition as a non-Solution 
 
Yet although polarisation is centrally about the sharpening up of boundaries, it should not be 
supposed that the location of these boundaries is in any way straightforward, whatever the 
protagonists may say: on the contrary it is precisely because of intense confusion   and thus 
dispute   about the location of such boundaries that processes of ethnic polarisation become s 
ridden with irresolvable contradictions. There are a number of dimensions to such confusions. 
 In the first place, many of the allegedly absolute social and cultural disjunctions upon which 
demands for partition are founded usually turn out, on closer examination, to be much less 
deep-rooted, and much less sharply drawn than the more enthusiastic protagonists of 
separation suggest. What one much more usually discovers, instead   and most especially so 
during the early stages of polarization   is a cultural contin um, in which the extremes are 
indeed sharply differentiated, but where there is a great deal of fuzziness at the centre of the 
scale. Here we find people who combine within themselves all sorts of supposedly wholly 
contradictory characteristics, such a  Muslims who routinely consult Brahmin priests, Hindus 
who set great store by the mystical power of Pirs, and Sikh families who have long brought up 
at least one of their sons as Hindus.  
 Such cultural continua are of course an anathema to committed polarisers, for they mess up 
the neat boundaries which their conceptual sets demand. But if such boundaries do not exist, 
they can easily enough be created, and so it is that "confusions" of this kind are invariably the 
first target of the reform movements which accompany every polarization. These put immense 
pressure on all those in the centre of the scale, insisting   often very competitively   that they 
throw in their lot much more firmly with either one side of the other, by conforming much 
more closely to the new orthodoxies which such reform movements invariably seek to 
establish.  
 But if the fuzziness of cultural continua can be resolved by the process of ethnic boundary 
construction   so reminding us that clear-cut ethnic differentiation is anything but innate   the 
resolution of spatial fuzziness invariably proves far harder. In such circumstances geographical 
boundaries always a subject of intense dispute, not only because both sides will always stake 
claims to the largest possible territory, but also ecause wherever such boundaries are finally 
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drawn, many people are bound to find themselves trapped on the "wrong" side of the new 
border. Fears for the safety of one's compatriots exposed to the tender mercies of the other 
side invariably adds yet more fuel to the fire: every move by the one side to secure its own 
interests and territorial integrity will seem maliciously threatening to the other.  
 As polarization becomes increasing severe so territorial partition will begin to be perceived, 
despite its large costs   and as Punjab's experience shows, those can be very large indeed   as 
the only solution. But although physical partition may indeed resolve the immediate problem, 
in no way does it resolve the issue of ethnic polarization per se: on the contrary the hydra 
invariably returns, and in a yet more poisonous form. The reasons are clear enough. Far from 
being a unitary phenomenon, ethnicity is intrinsically segmentary. Thus every division can be 
expected to contain a further set of sub-divisions of like kind within itself, each of which are 
potential sources of just as vigorous, and just as irresolvable, processes of polarization as 
those at the next step up.  So it is that partition of the sub-Continent has in no way halted 
processes of polarization. Instead well- ducated Sri Lankans have watched their island's 
nascent prosperity disappear into a morass of ethnic conflict; and while Bangladesh seceded 
from Pakistan in the midst of a bloody civil war, both sides are still rent with ethnic tension: in 
the former both Biharis and Hindus eke out a precarious existence, while in the latter what 
amounts to another civil war has broken out between the Sindhis and Muhajirs, though 
tensions between both of these and the Pathans and Punjabis are not much less s vere. Nor are 
these contradictions confined solely to the periphery, for within India itself tensions between 
Hindus and the remaining Muslims of U.P., let alone the parallel contradictions in almost every 
other region, pose a similar threat to its prosperity and stability of India of the world's largest 
democracy.  
 Likewise a further partition of Punjab itself is most unlikely to provide a solution to the 
problem of ethnic polarization, for in the (surely unlikely) event of the emergence of an 
independent Khalistan, there is every reason to suppose that it, too, would be rent by similar 
divisions. Despite the best efforts of the ideologues of Sikh unity, the plain fact is that there 
are no fewer contradictions, and therefore no less of a potential for polarization, between the 
major Sikh castes   such as the Jats, Khatris, Ramgarhias, Ravidasias and so forth   than 
between any of the other groups which we have considered here.  
 All this evidence drives us in the direction of two fairly obvious conclusions. Firstly that all 
contemporary societies   and no less so in the sub-Continent than anywhere else   are 
intrinsically pluriform: that is they contain within themselves a multitude of religious and 
cultural disjunctions, any and all of which are potential sources of ethnic polarization and 
conflict. Secondly, it is equally clear that contrary to the presuppositions of the vast majority 
of social theorists, the parochial chauvinisms and false conciousnesses whose collapse they so 
confidently expected in the face of a tide of progress and modernization have done nothing of 
the sort: everywhere one chooses to look ethnic contradictions are growing more, not less, 
salient. Far from being a "tribalistic" hangover from a "traditional" world, it is becoming 
increasingly manifest that ethnic polarization is a quintessentially moder phenomenon. How is 
this to be explained? 
 
The Pathological Consequences of Democracy 
If the twentieth century has been marked by the explosive growth of ethnic polarisation, so to, 
it is worth remembering, it has also witnessed the emergence of an almost universal 
acknowledgement that democracy is the only sound basis for political organisation. Could the 
two be linked? 
 In the wake of the collapse of all the world's great Empires, democracy now has few 
serious rivals as a means of organising and governing large scale political units, and of 
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legitimizing and constraining the activities of those who exercise of State power. Yet as 
innumerable contemporary conflicts dramatically emphasise, the application of 
straightforwardly majoritarian principles   such that majority support for any given measure is 
regarded as a sufficient test of its legitimacy - cont ins a potentially disastrous flaw when the 
population concerned is ethnically polarized.  
 When applied in a society which is full of conflicting interests, but where those interests 
both shift and cross-cut one another in complex ways, majoritarian democracy works well. But 
once ethnic polarisation starts to intensify, all differences of opinion, perspective and interest 
begin to be perceived as being congruent with one another, and thus are ever more inexorably 
articulated in ethnic terms. In such circumstances majoritarian democracy soon breaks down 
as a vehicle for the promotion of social justice, at least as far as any minority group is 
concerned. No matter how loudly, coherently and eloquently they articulate their distinctive 
interests and concerns, they will never, by definition, secure sufficient votes to win any 
argument. Yet any protest they might make about the injustice and untenability of being 
condemned to the position of an eternal loser often brings yet  greater calumny. In such 
situations majority groups regularly   if hypocritically   present themselves as the guardians of 
both progress and justice; having used the canons of democracy to institutionalise the 
supremacy of their own interests, they then turn them on the minority, insisting that having 
lost the "democratic" argument they should put up and shut up, and stop causing further 
trouble. 
 If applied in this way   as it so often is in all parts of the contemporary world   democracy is 
only too obvious a recipe for social tension, rather than a remedy for social injustice. 
 
Changing Understandings of the Origins of "Innate" Difference 
 
A further dimension of the modernity of current processes of polarization is the radical 
changes that have taken place in conventional understandings of the groundings of the 
categorical differences which give rise to these disjunctions. A hundred years ago, the Indian 
social order was of course disjointed by a fault line which was clearly no less unjust, and 
indeed a great deal more provocative, than those which can be witnessed today: that between 
the sub-Continent's British (or more precisely its English) rulers and their indigenous subjects. 
But in keeping with the spirit of the times, the colonizers conceptualized and justified this 
disjunction   and so the imposition of their Raj   on biological grounds. Europeans in general, 
and Anglo-Saxons in particular, were held to be racially superior to their non-European 
subjects. Not only was this theory used to justify the construction of an Imperial edifice, but 
also to argue that however much Indians might seek to educate and "civilize" themselves, they
would never have the capacity fully to catch up with their white masters and mentors.  
 Today, of course, such visions of biologically innate difference have been largely 
discredited, thanks both to the findings of biological science, and to the genocidal excesses 
perpetrated by the Nazis in the name of this theory. Nevertheless innatism itself has by no 
means disappeared: as biological determinism has become unfashionable, it has simply been 
recast. They have been replaced instead by a multitude of (mostly inchoate) theories about the 
innate character of cultural, ethnic and religious differences of all kinds; a characteristic result 
of this way of thinking is the view   which is, as far as I can see so widespread as to be taken 
for granted in almost all quarters, and no less so in contemporary Britain than in the sub-
Continent   that individuals can only possess a single "identity". And that "identity" is 





The Mobilizing Potentialities of Innatism 
 
If cultural innatism of this kind is widespread, it is also easy to see why such a mode of 
thinking should be so attractive to those involved in processes of ethnic polarization, and most 
especially so when representative democracy is the name of the game. In the first place 
innatism directly facilitates collective organisation, for it allows interests groups of all kinds   
whether in a majority or a minority   to construct clearly defined boundaries around 
themselves on the grounds that "we" are manifestly and quite unequivocally different from 
"they". Secondly it facilitates the development of social pressure on all those contained within 
those boundaries to the effect that they have a moral   and yet more powerfully and 
persuasively still, a sacred   obligation to close ranks in mutual support, the better to advance 
their collective interests.  
 It is also worth noting that while such mobilization is invariably directed towards 
protecting and adv ncing the group's material interests   whatever they happen to be   
collective action of this kind is equally invariably competitive in character: hence ethnic 
aggregation is almost  always a response   defensive from an insiders point of view, but 
aggressive from without   to parallel processes of mobilization amongst a rival group or 
groups.  
 But while it is easy enough to see why innatist assumptions - whether they be biologically 
or culturally grounded   should be so attractive to those who are actively involved n the 
dialectics of ethnic polarization, it is quite clear that if we are ever to gain an understanding of 
the way in which the endless spirals of distrust which polarization engenders might be 
unwound, the closest possible attention must be paid to two basic questions: 
(a)  Is it the case that the differences between those involved in such 
processes of polarization are actually as innate as they are commonly believed 
to be?  
and (b) is it the case those differences, even where they have long historical roots, have lways 
had such vigorously divisive consequences as they self-evid ntly do at present? 
Given a little historical investigation, such questions can most usually be answered empirically   
and more often than not produce results which stand in sharp contrast to the popular 
historiographies assiduously developed by the protagonists of polarisation. The differences 
here are clearly crucial, and not just with resect to the issue of historical truth. What is 
ultimately at stake is the question of whether ethnic polarisation is innate and immutable, or 
whether   to the contrary   it is a politically generated, and therefore re-negotiable, process.  
 As far as Punjab is concerned, two crucial questions are worth asking. First, did ethnic 
polarisation in anything like its contemporary form ante-date the imposition of the British Raj? 
And secondly, if it did not, what was it about the Raj, and/or about Punjabi reactions to it that 
fomented the growth of such polarization? 
 
Religion and Society in pre-British Punjab 
 
The religious disjunctions around which Punjab's current patterns of polarization have been 
precipitated are certainly of very long standing, for they are the product of nearly a thousand 
years of social and political ferment, whose roots can in many ways be traced back to Mahmud 
of Ghazni's successful invasion of the province early in the eleventh century. Incorporated, 
from then on, a whole series of North Indian Muslim Empires, Punjab's ruling elite was 
Muslim too, at least until Maharajah Ranjit Singh seized control of Lahore in 1800, in the 
wake of the chaos produced by yet another marauding Afghan army. Sikh rule did not last for 
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long, however. Although the British were exceedingly wary about taking on the Punjabis as 
long as the Maharajah was alive, they moved swiftly towards incorporating it into their Raj as 
soon as he was dead. Even so they faced a tough job; it took ten years to subdue resistance, 
when the remnants of Ranjit Singh's still-powerful army was defeated at the battle of 
Chillianwala in 1849.  
 Punjab's contemporary religious mosaic is also best understood against the background of 
these political developments. Right at the outset, prior to Mahmud of Ghazni's invasion, the 
whole of Punjab's population was nominally Hindu, although popular belief and practice was 
also heavily influenced by Tantric Buddhism, most especially in the more westerly parts of the 
region. Much had changed, however, by the time of the imposition of British rule. In the west, 
the great majority of the population, especially in the rural areas, had converted to Islam; there 
was a significant degree of commitment to Sikhism in the central areas, and only in the far 
eastern and southern areas was the rural population still overwhelmingly Hindu. 
 
The Growth of Islam 
 
How had this come about? That north India's ruling Muslim elite   most of whose members 
claimed Central Asian descent   imposed themselves by force  on the local population is clear 
enough. But did the imposition of Muslim rule extend to forced conversion? Despite the 
widespread popularity, especially amongst Hindu and European commentators, of the view 
that the Islamic tradition is both rigidly authoritarian and profoundly intolerant, such that its 
followers will always seek to gain furtherrecruits by force, there is no evidence that the 
ancestors of the vast majority of contemporary Punjabi Muslims were converted to Islam in 
this way, nor even that they did so in an effort to curry favour with the ruling elite. On the 
contrary conversion was the outcome of a much gentler process, pressed forward by the 
proselytizing efforts of innumerable sufi pirs. These saintly apostles of Islam   whose shrines 
are still honoured to this day   for the most part presented themselves as mystically inspired 
miracle-workers with powers akin to those of Hindu Yogis; indeed their mazars ave not 
infrequently been constructed right on top of the remains of Buddhist stupas. In these 
circumstances not only did Islamic practice in rural areas tend to differ sharply from that of the 
urban elite, but the very process of becoming Muslim was often drawn out over several 
generations: indeed if reasonably comprehensive conformity to the requirements of the sha i'a 
is taken as the test, then many of Punjab's Muslims only became fully Islamic in their behaviour 
under the influence of the reform movements of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 If currently popular historiographies of the development of commitment to Islam in rural 
Punjab require substantial revision in the light of a close and careful scrutiny of the historical 
evidence, the same is even more true with respect to Sikhism, not least because the two most 
commonly made generalisations about its origins and growth   that Nanak's teachings were a 
synthesi between Hinduism and Islam, and that the faith developed as a defensive response to 
the encroachments of Islamic proselytization   both fail to stand up to historical scrutiny.  
 
The Development of Sikhism 
 
Although born a Hindu, Nanak himself would undobtedly have been familiar with Islamic 
theology, for his family's hereditary employment was as junior administrators directly 
responsible to the ruling Muslim elite. However his teaching was in no way the reconciliation 
of Hindu and Islamic theology that many recent commentators   from Khushwant Singh 
onwards   have suggested. As McLeod has shown, Nanak's teachings fall squarely into the 
nirguna sampradaya or Sant tradition of Northern India. To be sure he was one of the most 
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articulate and effective exponnts of this position, but what Nanak brought together was two 
of the most significant strands in fourteenth century Hindu religiosity in North India   Nath 
yoga on the one hand, and Nirguna Bhakti on the other; specifically Islamic concepts are only 
minimally represented in his teaching. Nor is there any sign that Nanak saw himself as the 
founder of a distinct and coherently organised social group, and still less of an independent 
religion. Besides identifying himself solely as a religious teacher, his emphasis on the interior 
nature of true spiritual practice led him explicitly to debunk the value of all overt ritual and 
social activities. As he saw it, such physical activities were only to be valued as aids to an 
internal process of spiritual enlightenment. 
 Yet however noble and inspiring Nanak's position may have been in spiritual terms, it was 
not one which offered his successors   keen as they were to perpetuate his teachings   a secure 
foundation for the construction of a stable, secure, and well-organised religious community 
within which to do so. Hence their very success in establishing such a community inevitably 
involved a certain amount of deviation from the pure simplicity of Nanak's original teachings: 
his immediate successors established tirath (pilgrimage centres), first at Goindwal and later at 
Amritsar, set up an administrative system for the collections of offerings. As their following   
and so the Sikhs' collective wealth   grew steadily in size, so the Gurus, as leaders of the new 
sampradaya, began assume an increasingly significant position in local politics, as was made 
directly manifest in the deliberately ambiguous title Sacha Padshah   Emperor of Truth, but 
equally True Emperor   which the Gurus adopted.  
 
The Politicization of the Sikh Guruship 
This transformation of the status of the Guru was to have momentous consequences for the 
development of Sikhism. For the followers of a mystical/sectarian movement   whether in the 
Hindu or the Muslim tradition   to gradually surround their leader with the trappings of royalty 
was certainly not an unusual development, nor was the tendency of such leaders to become 
embroiled in local politics, for the very scale of their following made them forces to be 
reckoned with. But that also made the movement extremely vulnerable to the twists and turns 
of Imperial politics.  
 Very much in keeping with his own policy of syncretism, it was the Mughal Emperor 
Akbar (1543-1605) who presented the fourth Guru, Ram Das 1534-1581), with the land on 
which the town and temple of Amritsar was subsequently constructed by his immediate 
successor, Arjun Dev (1563-1606). Had Akbar been succeeded by his equally liberal minded 
grandson Khusrau, who had been heavily influenced by Mian Mir   a leading Sufi teacher of 
Lahore, and a close associate of Arjun Dev   the course of Punjabi, and indeed Indian, history 
might have been very different. But that was not to be. In the aftermath of Khusrau's 
unsuccessful attempt to evict his much more narrow-minded uncle Jehangir from the throne in 
Agra, all his friends and associates   including Guru Arjun Dev   were bloodily eliminated.  
 Just why was Arjun executed? While latter-day Sikh historiographers now routinely 
represent the fifth Guru as Sikhisms' first martyr to Islamic fundamentalism, there seems to be 
little substance to their case. The better view is that  he and his community were not so much a 
threat to Islam, but rather to that faction of the Muslim elite which had just gained control of 
the Imperial gaddi. His elimination was a function of Imperial politics, not of religious 
polarization. 
 Nevertheless his death profoundly transformed the nascent Sikh community; if successive 
Gurus had been gaining ever greater secular power, then the saintly Arjun's successor 
Hargobind (159-1644) adopted an explicitly military style of leadership, for in addition to 
being very fond of hunting, he also kept a small standing army of his own, leading Mohsin Fani 
to report that: 
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The Guru had eight hundred horses in his stables, three hundred troopers on horseback, 
and sixty men with firearms were always at his service (Quoted in Khushwant Singh, 
Vol 1 p.64) 
That the Sikh Gurus still attracted widespread support amongst the non-Muslim p asa try of 
central Punjab is clear enough, for without it Hargob nd would have been quite unable to 
equip himself in this way. But at the same time his position as  leader of a private Army led to 
him becoming even more deeply enmeshed in regional politics than any of his predecessors, 
sometimes in alliance with, bu  much more usually in opposition to, the Mughal authorities. So 
severe did these conflicts become that Hargobind was forced to shift his headquarters away 
from Amritsar   which was dangerously exposed to assault since it lay hardly 30 miles from the 
centre of Mughal power in Lahore   to the greater security of a new fortress of Kiratpur, 
tucked away in the Himalayan foothills to the north of Punjab.  
 Throughout the seventeenth century, successive Mughal Emperors and Sikh Gurus played 
a game of cat and mouse, offering later commentators to present the development of Sikhism 
during this period   which culminated in Guru Gobind Singh's creation of the explicitly militant 
khalsa   as being driven forward primarily in response to Muslim oppression. Yet however 
popular such an interpretation may now be, it involves a major sleight of hand, for once again 
conflict with the Mughals should not be mistaken for religious polarization. So, for example, 
the "Sikh Armies" of this period invariably included Muslim Pathans, and w ile Guru Gobind 
Singh fought almost as many battles with the Hindu Hill Rajas as he did with local Mughal 
administrators, by the time of his death in 1708 he was leading his forces in support of a 
Mughal campaign subdue opponents of Imperial rule in Central India.  
 With Gobind Singh's death the hereditary Guruship   which had hitherto provided the 
central physical focus for corporate Sikh unity   came to an end. And although Nanak's 
teaching quite clearly continued to inspire large numbers Punjabis, it wo ld be quite wrong to 
conclude that that commitment alone was a sufficient basis for coherent and coordinated social 
and political action. Given the wide variety of potential interpretations of what it meant to be a 
Sikh   which ranged from a continued commitment to Nanak's internally-orientated mysticism 
right through to further elaborations of Gobind Singh's thoroughly externalised militarism   
eighteenth century Sikhism consisted of a large number of often- contradictory strands. In no 
way did the Sikhs of this period form a coherent and unified community.
 While all of these strands have undoubtedly contributed to what we now know as Sikhism, 
popular Sikh historiography has put much more emphasis on some of them than others. As a 
result little iscurrently known about the more mystical and spiritually oriented strands of 
eighteenth century Sikhism, not least because small-scale, charismatically led, and largely 
rurally-based sectarian movements tend to leave few very substantial historical traces. Rather 
more information is available, however, about those who were primarily inspired by Gobind 
Singh's reinterpretation of Nanak's teachings, and who used them to justify a wide range of 
explicitly military activities. Those who followed this path eventually formed themselves into a 
number of guerilla bands or misl. In stark contrast to Nanak's mystical quietism, misl me bers 
were primarily warriors. But little, if any, of their energy was directed towards defending the 
collective interests of the Sikh community   indeed no such entity existed. Rather the primary 
concern of each misl was to maximise its control of territory, tribute and loot; inter-misl 
competition was intense, the more so as Mughal authority steadily waned.  
 
Ranjit Singh and the Kingdom f Lahore 
 
During the first forty years of the nineteenth century, however, these quarrels were 
transformed by the immense political and strategic successes of Ranjit Singh (1780-1839). 
 16
Ably supported by his mother-in-law, the young leader of the Sukhercha ia misl took control 
of Lahore in the summer of 1799 as the last of the Afghan invasions of Punjab, led by Shah 
Zaman, finally petered out. Various m sldarhad temporarily occupied Lahore before, but 
Ranjit Singh was different, for he aimed to stay permanently. In a series of daring military 
campaigns, which were also accompanied by a series of carefully though out strategic alliances   
for the other misldar by no means welcomed his growing pre-eminence   Ranjit Singh 
gradually consolidate his hold not just ver the city, but over the greater part of the Punjab, so 
much so that in 1801 he assumed the formal title of Maharajah. This was a very radical 
development, for it had been many centuries since Punjab had had a politically autonomous 
ruler of its own.  
 Yet what sort of entity was it that Ranjit Singh had constructed? To many latter day Sikh 
nationalists, it goes without saying that this was a Sikhkingdom. Nominally, at least, there is 
much to support such a view. Not only was Ranjit Singh himself very con ciously a Sikh, but 
many of the formal symbols of his rulership were explicitly Sikh in character. Thus the coins 
struck to celebrate his rule bore Nanak's name, while his government was formally known as 
Sarkar Khalsaji. However in other respects the Sik  veneer was very thin. Even at the outset, 
the majority of the population over which he exercised his rule was composed of Muslims, and 
his kingdom expanded ever further to the north and west, the Muslim predominance increased. 
Nor did he carry all themisldars with him: the Sikh chieftains of the Malwa   the region to the 
South of the river Sutlej   allied themselves with the British in order to avoid subjecting 
themselves to Ranjit Singh's suzreignty. And even within the kingdom Sikhs only 
predominated in military affairs: virtually all the Maharajah's other ministers and senior 
administrators were either Muslims or Hindus.  
 While sheer statecraft may well account for Ranjit's strong commitment towards the even-
handed treatment of all his subjects' religions, it is also worth noting that logic of his claim to 
the status of Maharajah also stood in sharp contradiction to the powerfully underlined 
egalitarianism of Sikh ideology. As leader of the Sukherchakia misl, Ranjit Singh could, and 
did, claim to be no more than primus inter pares   at least amongst his fellow misldars. But no 
claimant to the title of Maharajah of Punjab could brook such comparison. Hence it should 
come as no surprise that despite all the rhetoric of the khalsa sirkar, Ranjit Singh also 
employed the classic legitimising strategies of interloping aspirants to royal status in Hindu 
India, paying vast sums to Brahmins to persuade them to perform elaborate rituals which only 
kshatriyas and Kings were permitted to patronised. Hence, amongst other things, Ranjit Singh 
was sent off into the next life in exactly the manner that any Hindu Raja would expect: under 
the supervision of the raj purohit, his eldest son lit the funeral pyre at an auspicious moment, 
sending four ranis and seven concubines to death alongside their royal master.  
 What emerges from all this is that the forty years during which Ranjit Singh ruled Punjab 
were indeed one of the most glorious periods in its history. The royal court in Lahore was 
wealthy and sophisticated, and besides bringing political stability to the whole region, the very 
power of the state which he established kept the British at bay for several decades. Yet despite 
the fact that this was nominally a Sikh kingdom, Ranjit Singh's reign was not a period during 
which itself Sikhism was revitalised, nor one where any of the strands of which the Sikh 
tradition was made up attracted substantial numbers of new recruits. Indeed all the evidence 
suggests that the very opposite took place.  
 Thus although the British authorities were later to develop something of a soft spot for the 
Sikhs, their initial assessment was that the whole movement was on the point of collapse. 
Writing in the immediate aftermath of British conquest, Sir Richard Temple reported that 
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The Sikh faith and ecclesiastical polity is rapidly going where the Sikh political 
ascendancy has already gone. Of the two elements in the old Khalsa, namely, the 
followers of Nanak and the followers of Guru Govind, the former will hold their ground 
and the latter will lose it. The Sikhs of Nanak, a comparatively small body of peaceful 
habits and old family, will perhaps cling to the faith of their fathers; but the Sikhs of 
Govind, who are of more recent origins, and who embraced the faith as a religion of 
warfare and conquest, no longer regard the Khalsa now that prestige has departed from 
it. These men joined in thousands, and they now depart in equal numbers. They rejoin 
the ranks of Hinduism whence they originally came, and they bring up their children as 
Hindus. The sacred tank at Amritsar is less thronged than formerly, and the attendance 
at the annual festival is diminishing yearly. The initiatory ceremony for adult persons is 
now rarely performed. (Quoted in Ibbetson 1884:140)
 
Nor was this just a jaundiced British view. Principal Teja Singh, the noted Sikh historian, 
presents a similar account of the parlous state of Sikhism during this period, arguing that most 
Sikhs   if Sikhs they were   had become virtually indistinguishable from Hindus. As he puts it, 
Sikhism ... became a mere fashion of temple and beard ... but in all other ways the Sikhs 
showed no life in them. They worshipped the same old gods, indulged in the same old 
religious practices from which their Gurus had worked so hard to extricate them. Their 
baptism and five symbols became a mere anomaly. They were Hindus then, and it would 
have astonished them if anyone had suggested that they were not. (Teja Singh 
1944:118-19) 
 
Yet although Sikhism was   as we shall see in a moment   to undergo an immens  revival 
during the course of a century of British rule, just what accounts for its almost terminal decline 
during the preceding period? Between them, Temple and Teja Singh provide most of the 
answers. Firstly, it is clear that the khalsa strand of Sikhism around which the misls were 
constructed, and which Ranjit Singh also used (at least when not operating in a kshatriya 
mode) as a source of legitimacy for his royal authority was only one amongst many, and that it 
was one which was primarily used by, andattr ctive to, a militarily oriented peasant-guerilla 
rural elite. But once a small section of that elite had institutionalised itself in a position of 
power and privilege, the militant egalitarianism of the khalsa ceased to be attractive: the more 
they were drawn towards kshatriya-style hierarchy, the more their commitment to Sikhism fell 
apart. However the other more rural and less militant strands of Sikhism   here best 
understood as a commitment to the memory of Nanak's teachings   remained very much alive. 
Thus in the early days of British rule the Sikhs most certainly did not form a distinct, clearly 
bounded and self-conscious community: rather they were then one of Hinduism's many 
revisionist sects. It was only as a result of the polarising processes set in train by the 
imposition of British rule that the Sikhs routinely began to perceive themselves as members of 
a coherent and socially autonomous ethnic group, and as followers of a distinct and a wholly 
independent religious tradition of their own.  
 
Hinduism in pre-British Punjab 
 
Although Hinduism is best regarded as Punjab's "native" religion, for it is the substratum out 
of which conversion to other traditions   and most notably to Islam and Sikhism   has gradually 
taken place, a more positive identification of just what Hinduism is, rather than what it is not, 
is perhaps even more problematic in Punjab than it is elsewhere in the sub-Conti ent. While 
Punjab was almost certainly the birthplace of Hinduism more than two millennia ago, in more 
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recent imes it has not been a centre of institutional orthodoxy: Punjab has no major temples, 
no major pilgrimage centres, and no major centres of religious scholarship. Nor do Punjabi 
Brahmins enjoy a particularly exalted position. In the absence of royal sponsors   who usually 
have a direct interest in supporting, and if necessary creating, a group of superior Brahmins 
who would in turn confirm their own superior regal status   Punjabi Brahmins have had to rely 
on the Jat peasantry as their principal source ofpatronage. However the Jats have shown little 
interest   given their strongly egalitarian tendencies   in seeking out priestly favours to confirm 
their success in games of mutual status competition. In consequence they have tended to 
regard Brahmins as mere "reciters of mantras", and hence as little more than a superior kind of 
kammi.  
 Given the relative eclipse of the Brahmins, as well as the tendency of the Jat peasantry to 
commit themselves to Sikhism wherever they had not converted to Islam, it is the region's two 
main trading castes, the Banias and Khatris, who have long tended to be Punjabi Hinduism's 
most powerful agenda-setters. In religious terms they have always tended to favour the more 
devotional and Vaishnavite forms of Hinduism, and at least i  the pre-British period, appear to 
have been little interested in political mobilization of any kind.
 What, then, can we conclude from this review of the process of religious diversification in 
pre-British Punjab? That Punjab's various religious traditin not only played a prominent role 
in community life, but also in a wide variety of processes of status competition and 
consolidation is obvious enough. What they emphatically did not do, however, was to provide 
an ethnic base for large-scale political movements. Thus in sharp contrast to developments in 
more recent times, and to the politically motivated historiographies still being produced by the 
protagonists of current disputes, religious and ethnic polarization was not a salient feature   if, 
indeed, it was a feature at all   of pre-British Punjabi politics. We are therefore left with a 
puzzle: just why was it that British rule precipitated such cataclysmic religious and ethnic 
polarization, the like of which Punjab had never seen before? 
 
The Religious and Cultural Implications of British Rule
 
There are good reasons for suggesting that the social and psychological impact of the 
imposition of British rule was a good deal more intense in Punjab than elsewhere in India. 
Firstly the Raj did not come in dribs and drabs, and as the outcome of the imposition of an 
ever-growing degree of hegemony over indigenous rulers. Rather it was the result of  direct, 
overt, and bloodily contested conquest. Secondly the British arrived in the region in a very 
self-confident mood, so although the "Punjab School" were strongly committed to brisk, 
straightforward and easily accessible administrative procedures, they were also great 
"improvers". In some respects this was greatly to the province's benefit, for it led them to put a 
great deal of effort into revitalising, and then into massively extending, the canal irrigation 
system, so laying down the basis for the Punjab's future prosperity. But late Victorian 
muscular Christians that they were, Punjab's new rulers were also great social improvers, 
strongly committed to the removal of such "evils" as sati and child-marriage, and indeed of the 
"irrational" and "superstitious" features that they felt were so prominent in virtually every 
aspect of Indian life. They had no qualms, in other words, about proclaiming the absolute 
superiority of their own ways, and the equally absolute inferiority of those of their subjects. 
Finally, as if to add insult to injury, Punjab's new rulers had no hesitation in indicating that the 
social gulf between themselves and their subjects was not only wide, but quite uncrossable. If 
Englishmen participated in an Indian world   their wives and children having been left safely 
back in the Cantonment   it was very explicitly on a paternalistic basis; however there was no 
way in which Indians, "blacks", might, or even might try, to participate in anything as the 
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Sahibs' equals. Education to anything beyond the very basic level was seen as "spoiling" the 
"sturdy rustic vigour" of the "true Punjabi"; it was mos certainly not perceived as a means of 
achieving social, and still less of racial, equality. 
 How, then, did the Punjabis react to this massive assault on their sensibilities? Outright 
physical opposition was one option, of course, and the Punjabis were cert inly no sluggards in 
that direction: a decade passed between the death of Maharajah Singh   before which the 
British had not dared to cross the River Sutlej   and the final defeat of the remnants of his 
army, by now much weakened by internecine conflits between rival claimants to his throne, at 
the battle of Chillianwala in 1849. And had it not been for the fact memories of that defeat   in 
which soldiers of the Bengal Army had played such an important role in ensuring British 
victory   still loomed so large in Punjabi consciousness, Punjab, too, might have risen in 
support of the 1857 mutiny. If Punjab had risen then, the British would undoubtedly have had 
extreme difficulty in regaining control of northern India.  
 But before we leave the mutiny to concentrate on Punjabi developments, it is worth 
pausing for a moment to explore the ethnic dimensions of those events. While the immediate 
aim of the mutineers was certainly restore the Mughal Emperor to his throne, it would be quite 
erroneous to presume that this was a specifically Muslim uprising: not only did the immediate 
precipitating cause of the rebellion   the belief that the army's new cartridge cases were 
smeared with both pigs and cows fat, making them equally polluting for Muslims and Hindus 
alike   cross the religious divide, but so too, did the mutineers legitimising slogans. For them 
the whole aim of the rebellion was to restore both din and dharm, in order to free themselves 
from what was explicitly perceived as the morally destructive conseqenc s f the hated 
feringhee's alien rule. If there was polarisation here it was between the British and their Indian 
subjects; while the former sought to justify and to legitimize their rule by reference to such 
ideas as "civilization" and "Christian standards", the latter were no less active in generating a 
rival moral position with which to resist the resurgent Raj. Although the mutiny was eventually 
bloodily repressed, the rebels' interweaving of Hindu and Muslim concepts and symbols points 
not just to an absence of tension, but rather to a highly successful process of inter-religious 
cooperation. 
 
Once they had consolidated their control over Punjab, the British managed to escape any 
parallel inter-communal challenge to their authority: even in 1857, support for the mutineers 
was patchy, and largely confined to the cis-Sutl j region, parts of which had been directly 
subject to British rule since the early years of the century. Nevertheless the contradictions 
which gave rise to the events of 1857 were as activ in Punjab as they were anywhere else, 
and religion offered just as a potent source of inspiration for rebellion.  
Just as in all other Imperial structures, British rule in India ultimately rested on the use of 
force, though this was also exercised as sparingly as possible. But in extreme circumstances   
namely the emergence of a collective challenge the very existence of the Raj   the British had 
no compunction about revealing that an iron hand was indeed concealed within the velvet 
glove. The punishment prescribed in such circumstances was deliberately designed to be 
terrifying: once the vestige of a trial had been conducted, each mutineer was tied to the mouth 
of a cannon and then quite literally blown to bits. 
 Such summary "justice" was routinely prescribed throughout the rebellious parts of the 
North West Provinces in the aftermath of the events of 1857, but in Punjab only one resistance 
movement seems to have been deemed sufficiently alarming as to require such exemplary state 
terror to contain it  the Kuka movement. Taking advantage of widespread disaffection 
amongst the peasantry, its charismatic leader, Guru Ram Singh, attracted as substantial 
number of followers as he argued that the proper response to the imposition of British rule 
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was to reconstruct the ideal of Guru Gobind Singh's militant khalsa. Ram Singh modelled his 
own behaviour on that of his illustrious predecessor   of whom some said he was a 
reincarnation. Very soon he was moving around rural Punjab in explicitly regal style: on his 
visit to Amritsar for Dushera in 1867, he was accompanied by nearly 3,500 followers. 
However it was not so much Ram Singh's success as a Sikh revivalist which worried the 
authorities, but rather that his preaching had an explicit political edge. Not only did h  urge his 
followers to avoid all contact with the British and their institutions   from Post Offices to 
Taxes   but his movement appeared to provide the institutional framework for the construction 
of an alternative social and political order.  
 However unlike the rebels of 1857, the Kukas made no attempt to unite Punjabis of all 
religious persuasions. For Ram Singh the restoration of dh rma was closely associated with 
giving high esteem to the cow: hence it was not direct confrontations with the British 
themselves, but rather a series of assaults by Kukas on cow-sl ughtering Muslim butchers   
many of whom may have been supplying British soldiers with meat   which finally provided the 
authorities with the excuse for which they had been looking to subject the Kuka movement to 
exemplary suppression.  
 
The Growth of the Arya Samaj 
 
Although the movement was clearly viewed as serious enough to warrant the ultimate 
sanction, the Kukas proved to be the last of Punjab's rebellions to be organised on a wholly 
traditionalist basis. Because all subsequent resistance movements were a product of much 
closer contact with the British Raj and its institutions, they were also much more 
comprehensively influenced by them. Nowhere was this more manifest than with respect o the 
Arya Samaj, the Hindu reformist movement which was to have such a dramatic impact on 
subsequent political developments that almost every other ethno-political movement in Punjab 
has, to this day, to be understood in relationship to it. Any exploratio  of the dialectics of 
religious polarization in Punjab must therefore be conducted against the backdrop of a clear 
understanding of the particular concatenation of interests, concerns and strategic objectives 
represented by the Arya Samaj. 
 In Punjab ev n more so than elsewhere in India, the growth the Samaj was a direct 
consequence of exposure to Western-style education. Once they had gained firm control of 
Punjab, the British authorities were keen to sponsor the establishment of a network schools 
and colleges throughout the province, primarily in order to train a cadre of clerks and junior 
administrators. It took a little time for Punjabi students to work their way right through the 
new system, but one of the principal reasons why Swami Dayananda was so e thusiastically 
received during his visit to Punjab in the summer of 1877 was that its first graduates had just 
then begun to emerge. This rising generation of newly-educated Punjabis were to have an 
immense impact on the politics of the province. Apart from a few Brahmins, the great majority 
of these pioneers belonged to one or other of the Hindu (and Sikh) trading castes; not only do 
most of them seem to have become enthusiastic Samajis, but many also persuaded many other 
members of their families   almost all of which were well-connected and extremely socially 
influential   to do likewise. As founders and organisers of the Arya Samaj in the Punjab, this 
small group of graduates soon became a core component of the region's urban elite, and were 
to remain so for many years to come.  
 The principal reasons why the first generation of western-educated Punjabi Hindus should 
have become such ardent nationalists are not hard to discern. Firstly Punjab was still newly 
conquered, so the memory of freedom from alien hegemony was still very much alive; 
secondly the pioneers of exposure to Western education inevitably face the contradictions of 
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that experience in their rawest possible form   lacking precedents of any kind, the adoption of 
more or less extreme positions s only to be expected; finally their teachers   the great majority 
of whom were missionaries   were not only very active proselytizers of intellectual and cultural 
Westernisation, but of Christianity too. The rising generation of educated young Punjabis thus 
found themselves faced by a full-blooded assault on virtually every aspect of their social, 
religious and cultural traditions.  
 No-where was that assault more uncompromising than in the sphere of religion, where the 
tactics used by the missionaries in their efforts to attract converts were quite unprecedented. It 
was not that the Punjabis were unused to proselytization: wandering teachers in search of 
devotees   be they Pirs, Sants, Bhagats, Gurus, or Yogis   were very much part of their 
experience. However although such indigenous religious activists were often critical of each 
others' teaching   if only to establish the uniqueness of their own position   proving their rivals 
to be wrong was in no way central to their teaching. Insofar as they actively sought devotees   
for it was part of the game to appear to be wholly disinterested in doing so   it was primarily 
by means of their saintliness and asceticism, reinforced by the magical powers which were held 
to accrue there from, which attracted devot es to such teachers. The missionaries could not 
have been more different: not only was the version of Christianity which they espoused 
thoroughly utilitarian and wholly un-mystical in character, but they also sought to achieve 
conversion by what they saw a  rational persuasion.  
 Christianity was, of course, a crucial component of the whole Imperial exercise in late 
nineteenth century. Never was the Raj more self-confident about the progressive character of 
its mission, nor its officials   both civil and military   more certain of their moral and cultural 
superiority. And it was through the Church   and specifically through the Church of England   
that these claims were ultimately expressed and legitimated. And although the style and 
objectives of most missionaries generally differed strikingly from those of the much more 
establishment-orientated Chaplains in the Cantonments, that very association ensured that they 
had the freedom to proselytize as vigorously as they chose. 
 Hence it was not only students who were subjected to a constant barrage of arguments to 
the effect that India's manifest economic, technological and political weakness was an 
inevitable consequence of the moral and ethical inferiority of its civilization: missionary 
evangelists took every available opportunity to put the same basic arguments in public, 
although they often expressed them in much cruder terms. This was the hey-day of the tract 
and pamphlet, which mission presses produced in vast quantities; it was also the hey-day of 
soap-box oratory, when keen young missionaries leapt to the challenge of standing on a street 
corner in Anarkali   Lahore's, and thus Punjab's, most famous bazaar   to preach the truth of 
Jesus Christ. Since they operated from a position of immense confidence, neither the tract-
writers nor the soap-box orators felt they needed concede anything at all to their opponents. 
Abuse was the order of the day, so if Hindus were slagged off as mindless idolaters, Muslims 
were mocked as dupes of a false and licentious prophet. 
 Since the Arya Samaj developed primarily as a defensive response to missionary pressure, 
the new movement modelled itself closely on the missionaries organisational styles. The Aryas 
gave high priority to publishing their own tracts, and to appointing their wn full-time 
preachers, the better to counter the new threat. As far as their teachings were concerned, the 
Aryas responded to the challenge by identifying virtually all the practices of which the 
missionaries were most critical   sati, the ban on widow-remarriage, the elevated status of 
hereditary Brahmins, and above all ritual practices involving physical images of deities   as 
irrelevant and unjustifiable accretions. Having established, at least to their own satisfaction, 
that Hinduism was just as textually-based, and just as much committed to ethical monotheism 
as was Christianity, they then set out to show not only that its roots were more ancient than 
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those of Christianity, but also that it was much more compatible with   and perhaps even the 
precursor of   modern science.  
 In ideological terms arguments of this kind provided the Aryas with an opportunity to turn 
the tables on the missionaries, and to build a vision of India and its civilization which wholly 
undermined the claims to legitimacy developed by the Raj. It also provided them with a 
practical organisational base from which to begin to challenge the physical hegemony of the 
Raj: one of the first actions of the Arya Samaj branches which were soon established in 
virtually every small town in Punjab was to start collecting money to establish educational 
institutions of their own. Very soon a network of Dayanada Anglo-Ve ic sch ols and 
colleges, operating in direct competition with those established by the Government and by the 
missionaries, prang up right across the province: the education which was a prerequisite for 
entry into the Punjab's now burgeoning professional elite could now be achieved without 
wholesale exposure to Christian modes of thought.  
 That did not mean, however, that all Hindus were equally enthusiastic about the Arya 
Samaj's reinterpretation of their religion. On the contrary many were outraged by their new 
interpretations, partly because of their willingness to dismiss   often on the basis of very 
dubious scholarship   so many established Hindu beliefs and practices, and partly because of 
the uncompromisingly blunt way in which those dismissals were framed. Hence the growth of 
the Samaj also led to the establishment of a whole series of Sanatanist   traditionalist   
movements, whose principal aim was to ensure that Hinduism was not undermined from 
within by the Arya Samaj's militant young modernisers.  
 While the rise of the Samaj   and the growing influence of its spokesmen and institutions   
caused a good deal of dissent on amongst the ranks of Punjabi Hindus, those same 
developments appeared to be a great deal more alarming to local Sikhs and Muslims. The 
consequences of their reactions to what members of both those communities came ever more 
explicitly to identify as a Hindu "threat" were to prove yet more far-reaching still.  
 
The Roots of Sikh Revivalism 
 
As we saw earlier, Sikhism was very much in decline when the British extended their Raj to 
the Punjab, and but for the effects of that intervention, its decline might w ll have continued. 
Three very different sets of factors appear to have precipitated that reversal. Firstly Gobind 
Singh's ideal of a militant khalsa constituted a very effective vehicle   as Guru Ram Singh's 
revolt showed   for the articulation of wholesale, if communally specific, resistance to the Raj 
and its institutions. Secondly   and in sharply paradoxical contrast   the British Indian Army's 
recruitment policy contributed very directly to a sharp resurgence in conformity at least to the 
external behaviourial conventions of the Khalsa. Presumably because they were impressed by 
the exotic physical appearance of bearded and turbaned Sikhs, the British decided that such 
men would make particularly loyal soldiers. Hence a number of elite Punjabi Regiments 
required all new recruits to adopt the regalia of the Khalsa before they could be accepted. But 
it was reaction to Arya Samaji propaganda which proved to be by far the biggest boost to Sikh 
distinctiveness.  
 At the very outset a number of leading Sikhs were ardent supporters of the Samaj, above 
all because it appeared to be such an effective bastion against the missionaries' proselytizing 
efforts. That did not last for long, however. Once the movement matured, the Sikhs, too, 
found that their traditions and their scriptures were being dismissed as illegitimate 
excrescences by Arya Samaji ideologues. Nanak's teachings were dismissed as worthless too, 
on the grounds that someone who knew no Sanskrit and who taught in Punjabi could not 
possibly have anything of philosophical significance to say. But although these criticisms in 
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many ways paralleled the Samajis' equally scathing attacks on conventional Brahminical rituals, 
they had very different implications. Rather than being a matter of theological dispute within  
single religious community, most Sikhs regarded such criticisms as part of a hegemonic 
attempt to obliterate their very existence.  
 Prompted by these fears, members of the Sikh elite also began to organise themselves on 
their own account, forming a rival chain of Singh Sabhas to defend themselves against the 
encroaching force of Arya Samaji criticism. However unlike the Sanatan Dharmis   whose 
principal aim was simply to preserve the status quo against Samaji criticism   the Singh Sabhas 
had much more active task to undertake if they were to establish a clear and categorical 
boundary between themselves and the Hindus, as now seemed necessary to keep those 
criticisms at bay. In doing so they very soon adopted an actively reformist role, which was at 
least as comprehensively revisionist in religious terms as was that of the Arya Samaj with 
respect to orthodox Hinduism.  
 The easiest way of establishing a clear boundary between themselves and the Hindus was, 
of course, to press all Sikhs to follow Guru Gobind Singh's injunctions and to adopt the 
external symbols of the beard and turban. But although the Singh Sabhas set about restoring 
the rules of the Khalsa with a will, they soon found that much more was required before they 
could incontrovertibly establish their distinctiveness. Domestic rituals, in particular, were a 
weak point, not least because all Sikhs   including the most devout   still routinely employed 
Brahmins to conduct all their domestic rites of passage. For many, this was the most telling 
indication that Sikhs were still "really" Hindus. 
 To refute that charge the Singh Sabhas   led by the more radical Lahori group   began to 
develop a whole series of counter arguments. Besides insisting that Nanak's religious 
inspiration was wholly independent of the Hindu tradition, they argued that Nanak's lack of 
Sanskrit was in no sense a matter for regret. In sharp contrast to the Arya Samaji approach, 
they actively celebrated the Gurus' use of the Punjabi language, and the use of the Gurmukhi 
script as a vehicle for their transmission, regarding both as highly positive markers of their 
distinctiveness. A neat   but crucial   contrast emerges here. If the Arya Samaj offered a means 
of articulating a sense of Indian nationalism in the face of Imperial exclusionism, then the 
Sikhs, finding that the Samaj's vision of India directly threatened their own autonomy, began 
to articulate a rival sense of Punjabi nationalism. The seeds of contemporary ethnic 
polarisation had been sown.  
 Even so, there was much more to be done before the argument that the Sikhs were not 
Hindus really became credible. Perhaps most importantly of all, they needed to disengage 
themselves from what they now came to perceive as their debilitating reliance on Brahmin 
purohits. Hence the period between 1890 and 1910 was marked by an immense amount of 
ritual inventiveness, as Singh Sabhas right across the Punjab began to create new, and 
distinctively Sikh rituals with which to cope with the major life-crises of birth, marriage and 
death. Since ancientness is invariably regarded as a crucial mark of legitimacy, contemporary 
Sikhs find the suggestion that many   if not all   of their "traditional" ritual practices are a late 
nineteenth century invention deeply scandalous: but as Oberoi has hown in some detail with 
respect to marriage, that is precisely what they are. 
 However the Sikhs were not alone in being heavily involved in the "invention of tradition" 
during this period: though they legitimated their creativity with a great deal of (la gely 
specious) Sanskritic scholarship, the Arya Samajis were doing just the same. Their principal 
defence against the missionaries' identification of Hinduism as essentially idolatrous was 
therefore to elevate the fire-sac ifice, hawan, to pride of place, dismissing all other ritual 
practices as irrelevant accretions. The Sikh reformers followed closely in the Samajis' 
footsteps, but in way that enabled them to claim that they were even better "ethical 
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monotheists" (the missionaries' criteria of religious respectability) than their rivals. Rather than 
the sacred fire, they made the Guru Granth Sahib itself the focus of all their ritual activities, 
and instead of becoming involved in tortuous redefinitions of the Brahmin's role, held that any 
Sikh familiar with the contents of the Granth Sahib could act as ritual officiant.  
 In the first instance these new rituals were only used by a small section of the urban elite: 
they only began to be widely used in peasant families towards the end of the nineteen thirties. 
Nevertheless their introduction was viewed with alarm both by the Arya Samaj, and even more 
so by Sanatanist Brahmins: the former saw such a move as an irrelevant and unnecessary 
diversion from their vision of unity, and the latter as a threat both to their income and their 
privileges. Confirming the Sikh reformers' worst fears about the dangers of Hindu hegemony, 
the leaders of both groups vigorously opposed the use of the new rituals. 
 While the emergent contradictions between different groups of refo mist can ultimately be 
traced back to the impact of British rule, a further ironic consequence of that very Raj was that 
it was now the British and their institutions who were destined to be the final arbiters of the 
dispute itself. The question was simple, though crucial: were marriages conducted according 
to the new rites legitimate in law, such that they would guarantee the transmission of property 
rights? Court rulings indicated that legislative change was required to ensure this, and in the 
very process of organising large-scal  protests which were needed to persuade the British to 
do this, the Singh Sabhas considerably enhanced their authority as the collective voice of Sikh 
interests. Meanwhile the fact that these changes were pushed through in the teeth of 
widespread Hindu opposition strongly reinforced the argument that the Sabhas were a vital 
means of protecting those interests from the dangers of Hindu hegemony.  
 If the mass protests which eventually led to the passage of the Anand Marriage ct i  1909 
were the first stage in the process in the collective politicization of the Sikhs, then it was the 
much larger movements   and much more violent confrontations   led by the Akali Dal, and 
which culminated in the passage of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act in 1925, which set the seal on 
these developments, finally completing the move towards the construction of a wholly 
separate social, political and religious identity which the Singh Sabhas had begun over forty 
years before. This time round the issue at stak could not hardly have been more crucial: 
nothing less than control of the Sikhs' own historic Gurdwaras. 
 Just as in most local Hindu shrines, the guardians of all Punjab's most important Sikh 
Gurdwaras were ascetic mahants. Though their behaviour, appearance and status was closely 
akin to that of Hindu sannyasi, they were members of the udasi sect, which, though it traces 
its origin to Guru Nanak's own son, Sri Chand, differs from the long-established Sikh 
mainstream by demanding that its members should remain celibate. Moreover the mahants had 
prospered under British rule: the land-holdi gs attached to most of the Gurdwaras had 
increased in value, Sikh revivalism, and the growing prosperity of rural Punjab had increased 
the scale of pilgrim donations, while the property-based legal system introduced by the British 
had turned mahants into virtual owners of all their temple's assets.  
 Although mahants' role in the Gurdwaras had never before been a cause for concern, in the 
face of growing support for he  neo- rthodox Tat Khalsa wing of the Singh Sabhas which 
took its cues almost entirely from Guru Gobind Singh such that all alternative interpretations 
of Nanak's teachings were regarded as misguided sell-o ts to Hinduism, their controlling 
position in the nascent community's most sacred shrines was becoming more and more 
untenable. Although the mahants found themselves under mounting pressure from the 
reformers either to conform to neo-orthodox expectations or to abandon their offices, none 
were willing lightly to abandon their positions of wealth, power and privilege, nor to change 
the theological positions to which they had long been committed. Conflict was inevitable, and 
most especially so when it became evident that this was an issue around which large scale 
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mobilisation of the peasant masses   rather than just a narrow section of the urban elite   could 
take place.  
 The scale of the popular response to the Akali Dal's call for "the expulsion of corrupt 
mahants" and "the restoration of the Gurdwaras to the Sikh community" during the early 
1920s, together with the mahants anguished appeals to the authorities for protection faced the 
British with a major dilemma. Their immediate instinct   powerfully reinforced by Vice-regal 
instructions from Delhi   was to suppress all disturbances which threatened public order, and 
to protect the mahants' property rights, as indeed vocal sections of urban Hindu opinion, led 
by the Arya Samaj, were also urging them to do. However the popularity of the cause   which 
was now seen as offering a challenge to both British and H ndu hegemony   not least amongst 
the Sikhs who now provided such a significant proportion of recruits into both the Army and 
the Police made local officials painfully aware of how dangerously provocative it was to 
follow a policy of unmitigated oppression. But in the end the British cracked before the Sikhs: 
after 400 people had been killed, and more than 30,000 arrested, control of all the historic 
Gurdwaras was handed over to an elected Sikh body, the Shromani Gurdwara Prabhandak 
Committee in 1925.  
 
(A Hasty) Conclusion 
 
The protests that led to that change constituted by far the most substantial challenge to the 
authority of the British Raj that the Punjab had yet witnessed, for they involved a far larger 
number of people than did the Kuka revolt half a century earlier. If the British did not resort to 
execution by cannon this time round, it was not so much because the rebellion was less 
threatening, but rather because it would have by then have been impolitic to resort to such a 
self-evidently savage means of repression. But it was not just the British who had changed: so, 
too, had the character of nationalist resistance. 
 To be effective, any nationalist resistance movement must generate a powerful sense of 
moral solidarity amongst its members: and as in political groups of all kinds, the greater that 
sense of solidarity, the more powerfully equipped it will be to achieve its goals, whatever they 
happen to be. But in India   as in most other culturally and religiously plural societies   that 
very drive for national unity has proved, paradoxically enough, to be an exceedingly potent 
recipe for national disunity. 
 In a further paradox, the very earliest movements of resistance   such as the rebellion of 
1857, and to a much less certain extent the subsequent Kuka revolt in Punjab   managed to 
avoid being gripped by the disjunctions which have subsequently proved so intractable: instead 
they succeeded in bridging those potential divisions by pitching their appeal for moral 
solidarity around a perception of their common difference from their immoral and alien 
feringhee overlords. But as the Raj matured, so too did the character of nationalist movements 
which it precipitated; and the more sophisticated those movements grew, the more remote the 
possibility of such inter-religious and inter-s ctarian cooperation became. Indeed as far as 
unity and social harmony are concerned, nationalism, democracy and even Independence itself 
appear to have brought decidedly double-e ged benefits: almost as much has been lost as has 
been gained. Why?  
 As nationalist movements matured, so the utility of inverse definitions (we are not 
feringhees) began to decline in significance. Most particularly amongst the elite   whose 
members encountered the force of Imperial cultural hegemony much more directly than any 
other section of the population   a great deal of thought and effort went into the construction 
of a more positive vision of themselves with which to resist the denigration so explicitly 
manifest in missionary discourse, but which was equally intrinsic to the whole Imperial 
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enterprise. While the explicit celebration of an alternative religious and cultural tradition 
clearly offered by far the best defense against the corrosive impact of such hegemony, such 
"traditionalism" was clearly nothing like so "traditional" as its proponents suggested. 
Established ways of doing things invariably require substantial readjustment, if not 
comprehensive reinvention, if they are to serve the purposes their users require of them in the 
new conditions where they are to be deployed.  
 There are two dimensions of this process of cultural reinvention which are absolutely 
crucial. Firstly it allows new ideas, and most particularly ideas which have in fact been directly 
borrowed from their oppressors, to be seamlessly and unthreateningly integrated into the new 
corpus on the grounds that they are actually of ancient origin. Secondly it facilitates the 
construction sense of corporate unity and common purpose, and indeed the very idea of 
nationhood,  a phenomenon which most usually did not ante-date he emergence of the 
nationalist movement itself. The Arya Samaj is, of course, a classic exemplar of both these 
processes.  
 Yet however successful this strategy may have been in generating a sense of unity and 
common purpose amongst Punjab's Hindu elite, and indeed amongst Punjabi   and ultimately 
amongst all North Indian   Hindus, it carried a sting in the tail. Like virtually all other 
nationalist movements world-wide, the one set of issues which the Arya Samaj quite signally 
failed to address was the implications of diversity. Given that the Samajis' newly constructed 
nationalism was firmly grounded in the ideological assumptions of upper-caste Hinduism, its
moral appeal declined sharply amongst those who were not firmly located in the mainstream of 
Hindu orthodoxy, and positively alienated those   like the Muslims   who self-evidently stood 
right outside it. Similarly their determination to identify a single basis of acceptable behaviour, 
and to reform all alternatives out of existence on the grounds that they weakened national 
unity, was bound to create a major disjunction between those who felt at ease with the new 
construction, and those who regarded what was on offer as containing almost as much 
potential for oppressive hegemony as did the British Raj itself.  
 This paper has sought to highlight the extent to which the Sikhs' reactions to this perceived 
threat closely paralleled the Arya Samaj's reaction to the Raj itself. They, too, have 
systematically reinterpreted past history to establish a new orthodoxy, which they have 
subsequently used to transform themselves into a very active socio-political group whose 
boundaries are clearly marked, and where those contained within those boundaries feel a 
powerful sense of mutual obligation towards one another. And although the origins of the 
dialectics of Arya/Sikh polarisation have to be traced back to the colonial context, 
Independence has in no way lessened th  vigour of that process: though the arena within 
which mutual polarisation is being worked out has now extended to cover the whole of North 
India, the gulf between the two sides is now wider than ever before. 
 But before moving on to consider these wider issues, some more specific points about 
these processes of ethno-ge esis are worth noting. Firstly the Arya Samajis were not alone 
dividing what they sought to unite: given more space, closer attention could have been paid to 
the vigorous divisions between the neo-orthodox khalsadhari Sikhs, and the more 
traditionalist ahajadharis, whom the khalsadharis succeeded in labelling as "slow-adopters", 
even though their interpretation of Sikhism was far closer to Nanak's original teachings than 
was that of their rivals; and in similar vein we might also have explored the vigorous responses 
of a range of other sects   notably the Nirankaris and the Radhasoahamis   to contemporary 
neo-orthodoxy. The second gap in the discussion presented here yawns yet wider still, for the 
Muslims (and indeed the untouchables) were no less active than were the Sikhs in organising 
neo-orthodox reform movements with which to respond to the perceived threat of Arya 
Samaji (and Sikh) hegemony. Paradoxically enough it was Ghulam Ahmed Mirza, whose 
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sectarian followers, the Ahmadiyyas, were seriously scapegoated during the early years of 
Pakistan's Independence in the name of Islamic unity, who was the principal spokesman for the 
Muslim camp in late nineteenth century Lahore. The principal r aso  for the later upset was 
that in vigorously defending Islam against Christian criticism, and even more scurrilous attacks 
from the Arya Samaj, whose pamphlet Ranglila Rasool caused great offense, Ghulam Ahmed 
declared himself not only to be the Mahdi, but a latter day incarnation of Jesus Christ. While 
much respected as a champion of Islam in his day, this reformed version of Islam proved too 
much for most Punjabi Muslims: so powerful were the schisms it precipitated that far from 
providing a vehicle for unity, hostility to the Ahmadiyyas is now one of the very few issues 
over which Punjabi Muslims find it at all easy to unite. 
 Much more work still remains to be done to explore the role of a wide variety of other 
reform movements in facilitating the process of ethno-genesis amongst Punjabi Muslims, and 
to set  these developments in the context of the dialectics of inter-communal rivalry   although 
what is clear is that the Muslims were much slower, and much less successful than were either 
the Sikhs or the Hindus in developing a clearly articulated sense of communal solidarity in the 
pre-Independence period, or indeed after it. 
 In exploring the development and direction this sense of communal solidarity   whether 
amongst Hindus, Sikhs or Muslims, or amongst their various internal schismatic sub-divisions   
it is also worth remembering that however important religious ideas may be as a vehicle for 
that sense of solidarity, an examination of those ideas alone will never be a sufficient basis for 
understanding the developing process of polarisation. Conflicting class interests   as, for 
example between the urban merchants who have formed the core of the Arya Samaj and its 
latter day successors, and the Jat peasantry who have been the driving force behind the gr wth 
of Sikh neo- rthodoxy throughout this century   invariably provide a better clue to the intense 
vigour of the politics of polarization. 
 A brief word is also in order about the extent of British responsibility for these 
developments. While natio list historians, especially in India, have often blamed the British 
for India's partition, this view must surely be regarded as too narrow, and indeed dangerously 
short-sighted now that India has been independent for nearly half a century. That the British 
exploited, and to some extent exacerbated, inter-communal tensions the better to play the 
game of divide and rule is clear. However it would be quite wrong to suggest that they 
deliberately created those divisions, other than in the sense of having established conditions 
which demanded the creation of a sense of nationalism   if only to throw off foreign hegemony   
within a territory whose population was so religiously and culturally diverse, and which also 
contained so many potential regional and classcontradictions, that it offered ample scope for 
the eruption ethnic polarization.  
 A further point worth mentioning here   if only because I have so far found no space to 
present any empirical evidence on the subject   is the role of representational democracy in 
exacerbating these contradictions. The more the British began to allow Indians to take part in 
local decision making   at first only at the level of the municipality, but later on extending to 
many aspects of provincial administration   the more i  becam apparent that the units of 
contention and debate, and even more so of electoral competition for seats on those bodies, 
was organised in religious and ethnic terms. The process was self-g nerating, and followed the 
same logic as in any other ethnically divided society: the moment that any one sect, caste, 
community or religious group appeared to be over-represented, those who felt themselves 
excluded   as someone always did   would promptly begin to organise and agitate on a rival 
basis in an effort to redress the perceived imbalance.  
 The approach of Independence yet further exacerbated these tensions, through a complex 
series of knock-on effects. Although the Unionist Party, which dominated the Punjab 
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Legislative Assembly in the immediate pre-Independence, had managed to contain these 
tensions through a careful set of cross-ethnic alliances between those with common 
agricultural interests, the coalition swiftly crumbled in the face of the prospect of the creation 
of a territorial Pakistan. Not that Punjabi Muslims thought much of the idea: rather it was the 
Muslims of U.P. who, because they were fearful of being condemned to be a permanent 
(electoral) minority, were the principal enthusiasts for constitutional arrangements whose 
object was to ensure this could never happen. But once the institutionalisation of Muslim 
majority control in Punjab began to look likely, Punjabi Sikh and Hindu fears that they would 
be subjected to a similar majoritarian squeeze led to the collapse of the fragile coalition; and as 
impoverished Muslim peasants began to vent their murderous anger against the Sikh and 
Hindu money-lenders who had for so long exploited them in the far north-west, while the far 
more prosperous Sikh peasantry of the canal colonies in the South planned armed resistance 
against any attempt to turn their region over to Pakistan, so everyone began to take revenge 
against everyone else in an endlessly escalating cycle of tit for tat killings. Partition became 
inevitable, although as we saw earlier, it has solved very little: though their loci have shifted 
somewhat, similar processes of polarization, whose implications are still just as destructive, 




Although Punjab   and indeed North India asa whole   is currently caught up in a particularly 
vigorous cycle of ethnic polarization, it is clearly not alone in its experience of the disastrously 
destructive consequences of these developments. Similar processes of racial and ethnic 
polarization have now erupted   or failing that lie close beneath the surface   right around the 
globe. For many observers, the vigour, and the universality of these developments has been 
wholly unexpected. Across the whole range of social-science perspectives, from the liberal-
individualists on the one hand to the Marxists on the other, one of the few things upon which 
everyone could agree was that ethnic solidarity was a phenomenon of declining significance. 
Whether labelled parochial irrationality or false consciousness, it was p rceived as a thing of 
the past, and as a traditional phenomenon which was bound to die. 
 Anthropologists may be better equipped than many to cope with the opposite view, that 
ethnic polarization is a quintessentially modern phenomenon. Thanks to the pioneering work 
of Barth and Cohen, we can start from a position which takes it for granted that ethnic 
boundaries are constructed, that they are a product of inter-c ltural contact and not non-
contact, and that an insistence on the traditional invarably marks the presence of rapid social 
change rather than its absence. On this basis we are also well equipped to show that ethnicity 
gains its mobilising power from its capacity to facilitate the construction of clearly marked 
boundaries, together with a powerful sense of moral solidarity, amongst those with common 
material interests of one kind or another.
 But ethnic contradictions are now becoming so serious that it is incumbent upon us to 
move out of our small-scale ghettoes. To be sure we may fumble at first in larger scale arenas 
(witness this paper in its current condition!), but there is a job to be done. I believe we should 
do it. But in addition to our perspective on the dialectics of polarization,  anthropologists are 
also well placed to set those processes in comparative context, and to highlight the 
commonalities which underlie innumerable local specificities.  
 Finally if we are to be the champions of the modernity   and hence the inescapability   of 
ethnic polarization, it also behooves us to address the question of how its worst consequences 
might be mitigated. Wishing it away as a thing of the past is clearly no help; nor is its 
reduction to something else; less helpful still is the expectation that increases in wealth, in 
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education, in communication and so forth will necessarily eliminate it. Until we can envisage a 
world which is proudly aware of its own plurality, yet which gives systematic recognition to 
the legitimacy of minority interests, we may all find ourselves in the midst of ethnic 
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